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Abstract 
 
The Equality Act 2010, in its content and passage through Parliament, provides a rare 
example of an Act that engages, to some extent, with all seven foundations of legal 
knowledge (the English compulsory subjects upon which other legal subjects build). 
This article examines the Equality Act 2010 through the prism of the foundations and, 
in light of ongoing reform, contends that while anti-discrimination law is an important 
subject it should not join the list of foundations but rather that awareness and 
appreciation of those foundations can provide a richer understanding of such laws as 
the Equality Act 2010. 
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The British Equality Act 2010 and the Foundations of Legal Knowledge 
 
Introduction 
 
The Equality Act 2010 was designed to unify, simplify and strengthen the myriad 
pieces of British anti-discrimination law which had emerged over the previous 40 
years as more and more grounds (or protected characteristics) were introduced and 
amendments to legislation (often European-derived) were made.
1
 Alongside this 
illustrious, and partially fulfilled, aim, the Equality Act 2010 also has a number of 
other distinguishments. It was one of the last Acts of the Labour Government of 1997 
– 2010, receiving Royal Assent during Prorogation, and the first to trial interleaving 
the explanatory notes with the Bill so as to aid user engagement, making it more 
accessible to both the specialist and the general reader.
2
 It was one of very few Bills to 
have been introduced in one parliamentary session and to have been carried over to 
another (its Commons Committee stage having taken place in the 2008/2009 session 
with Report and Third Reading taking place in the 2009/2010 session)
3
 and yet, 
                                                 
1
 As Race, then Disability, Religion or Belief, Sexual Orientation and Age joined Sex (including 
pregnancy/maternity, marriage/civil partnership and gender reassignment), the British anti-
discrimination statute book grew to ‘nine major pieces of discrimination legislation, around 100 
statutory instruments setting out connected rules and regulations and more than 2,500 pages of 
guidance and statutory codes of practice’ (Government Equalities Office, Framework for a fairer future 
- the Equality Bill (Cm 7431, 2008), 6).  This article refers to British discrimination law, rather than 
UK law, as discrimination legislation is a devolved, or transferred, power under the Northern Ireland 
Act 1998 and even before was subject to a separate system.  Very few provisions of the Equality Act 
2010 relate to Northern Ireland.   
2
 Following a report of the Procedure Committee recommending an experiment, the Bill and 
Explanatory Notes were made available as i) a PDF with both texts side-by-side, ii) HTML with the 
texts side-by-side, and iii) an interwoven web page (HTML). This was deemed a success by Harriet 
Harman but who nonetheless considered that the costs and the benefit of doing so should be assessed 
on a bill by bill basis (Harman, Letter to House of Commons Procedure Committee (January 2010) 
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmproced/memo/interleaving/ucm0102.htm> 
accessed 25 January 2013). See also UK Parliament Labs, ‘Equality Bill published in trial format’ (27 
April 2009) <http://parliamentlabs.wordpress.com/2009/04/27/equality-bill-trial-format/#comments> 
accessed 25 January 2013. 
3
 It was the seventh bill to be carried over since the introduction in 2004 of permanent procedures 
allowing bills to be carried over (House of Commons, Standing Orders of the House of Commons – 
Public Business, November 2007, HC 105 2007-08, SO No. 80A) and only the 14th bill to have been 
  
despite this, the Bill, as Lord Lester noted, ‘reached [the House of Lords] very late, 
with parliamentary time scarce before the general election’4 with scrutiny in the 
Commons having been far from full.
5
 It is also a rare example of an Act which affects, 
is affected by, or is an example of, all seven foundations of English law.  2015 will 
see a five-year review of the Equality Act 2010
6
 as well the continuing consideration 
by the professional bodies of the Legal Training and Education Review which could 
revolutionise legal training in England and Wales.
7
 
The seven foundations of legal knowledge were laid down by the English 
professional bodies in 1995 but they were predominantly built from the previous six 
compulsory subjects (the five core subjects identified by the 1971 Ormrod report
8
 – 
constitutional, criminal, land, contract and tort – together with the later addition of 
equity), but becoming less prescriptive as to the curriculum within them while adding 
European Law as the seventh.
9
 The underpinning rational for the seven foundations 
can be seen in the 1995 Joint Announcement by the Law Society of England and 
Wales and the General Council of the Bar which stated the foundation subjects  
arise from the fact that all prospective solicitors and barristers need a common 
grounding in these seven law foundations and because the vocational courses 
build on the students' knowledge of these foundations and must therefore be 
able to presuppose certain levels of familiarity, knowledge, awareness and 
                                                                                                                                            
carried over a parliamentary session since the first ad-hoc carry over of a bill (the Financial Services 
and Markets Bill 1998-99). 
4
 HL Deb 23 March 2010, vol 718, col 863. 
5
 Eg HC Deb 2 December 2009, vol 501, col 1193 (Dr Evan Harris); col 1183 (Mr Harper), col 1225 
(Miss Widdecombe), col 1230 (Mark Pritchard). 
6
 HC Deb 1 May 2014, vol 579, col 778WS (Mrs Grant). 
7
 It is possible that the Solicitors Regulation Authority in shifting to an outcomes focused process may 
cease to prescribe content (they have already cut back on quality assurance - 
http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/news/press/streamline-training-regs.page)) and the Bar Standards Board have 
embarked on a three-year ‘Future Bar Training’ programme of reform (although a degree will remain a 
requirement: https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/qualifying-as-a-barrister/future-bar-training/).  
8
 The Report of the Committee on Legal Education, Cmnd 4595.  The seven foundations relate to 
England and Wales as Scotland has a separate system of legal education (and representation). 
9
 A Boon and J Webb, ‘Report to the Law Society of England and Wales on The Consultation & 
Interim Report on The Training Framework Review (2002), para 36. 
  
appreciation. The foundations... also provide the basis for continuing legal 
education and professional development by providing solicitors and barristers 
with the necessary knowledge to enable them to break into new areas of law.
10
 
While the concept of there being seven foundations has been subject to strong 
criticism by some eminent academics, notably Peter Birks,
11
 the general concept of a 
general grounding has proved enduring within the qualifying law degree and the post-
graduate conversion course (the Legal Executive route, by contrast, having early 
specialisation as a hallmark).
12
 Indeed, the current Legal Education and Training 
Review, while not wanting to pre-empt further work by the regulatory bodies 
regarding outcomes, noted that ‘the range of evidence points to the existing 
Foundation subjects as a reasonable proxy for what is required’13 but has 
recommended that there should be further limited prescription as to what is required 
within the subjects.
14
 
For the foundations to have any worth, it is inevitable that the wide range of 
other topics – to quote Peter Birks the ‘hundred others’ that the professions ‘could not 
care less about’ (and including ‘very important subjects’ which he feared could be 
‘starved to extinction while all available energy is applied to the sustenance of the 
                                                 
10
 Advisory Committee on Legal Education and Conduct, First report on legal education and training 
(ACLEC 1996), 117 (Annex D). 
11
 Who, eg, referred to ‘to this miserable list of now seven compulsory subjects’ and opined that 
‘professions' systematic indifference to the well-being of all but seven subjects is not only myopic but 
bewildering’ (P Birks, ‘Compulsory Subjects: Will the Seven Foundations ever Crumble?’ [1995] 1 
WebJCLI). 
12
 Legal Executives are the third branch of the profession in England and Wales. 
13
 LETR (2013) Setting Standards: The Future of Legal Services Education and Training Regulation in 
England and Wales (The Final Report of the Legal Education and Training Review independent 
research team), para 7.93. See also paras 2.52-2.58. 
14
 LETR (2013) Setting Standards: The Future of Legal Services Education and Training Regulation in 
England and Wales (The Final Report of the Legal Education and Training Review independent 
research team), para 4.103.  The number and content of the compulsory subjects vary across the 
Commonwealth although there appears to be a common core of five or six of the seven foundations 
(EU law being less relevant for most and India excluding Equity in an otherwise much more extensive 
list).  Company and/or commercial law is included in, for example, Scotland, Canada, Australia and 
India (LETR (2013), para 4.98) but not England and Wales or Malaysia (see e.g. 
http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/admission_requirements.html) at the academic stage (company law 
is, however, a component of the English and Welsh vocational stage for solicitors). 
  
subjects which are strong and abundant’)15 – build on at least one of the foundations. 
Thus, labour law is founded on contract and tort (with some public law), company law 
on equity and contract, and the law of armed conflict on crime and public law, etc. 
While some subjects, family law for example, could conceivably touch on all of the 
English foundations,
16
 it is unusual for a single Act do so. The content of the Equality 
Act 2010, and the circumstances of its creation, cause it to engage – to varying extents 
– with all seven. 
However, it is worth considering whether the seven foundations achieve their 
aim of providing “[legal practitioners] … with the necessary knowledge to enable 
them to break into new areas of law …” and the Equality Act 2010 is a topical and 
arguably capacious prism through which to do that.  Discrimination (or equality) law 
may not be a mainstream academic subject and it does not, and arguably should not, 
form one of the distinct foundations but ‘familiarity, knowledge, awareness and 
appreciation’ of those foundations can provide a richer understanding of the scope, 
complexity and the context of what is nonetheless an important piece of legislation.  If 
the seven foundations are a good basis for legal education, one might reasonably 
expect some of them to be reflected in any legal topic.  It is suggested, as examined 
below, that the Equality Act is, in fact, a (rare) example of an Act which does reflect 
all seven foundations of English law. 
 
The Equality Act 2010: General framework and the Law of Tort 
 
As Sandra Fredman noted in 2001, ‘[t]here is no general equality guarantee; instead, a 
relatively sophisticated set of anti-discrimination statutes operates within a narrow 
                                                 
15
 P Birks, ‘Compulsory Subjects: Will the Seven Foundations ever Crumble?’ [1995] 1 WebJCLI. 
16
 Eg public law child orders, criminal domestic violence, property rights, constructive trusts, pre-
nuptial contracts, tortious harassment and European jurisdictional issues. 
  
area’. Back then there were only four main protected grounds or characteristics (the 
original two from the 1970s of sex and race, with the addition of disability in 1995 
and gender reassignment in 1999).
17
 The years since have seen the area increase in 
size, with a number of new Acts passed and Regulations tabled, and then the 
subsequent unification of those nine main pieces of legislation
18
 into the single 
Equality Act; but the lack of a general equality guarantee remains. Then, and now, 
British anti-discrimination law primarily sets outs to prohibit certain activities with 
regard to certain characteristics in certain circumstances and it does so through 
creating a statutory tort. The Equality Act 2010 is principally a restatement of the tort. 
Since the seminal Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA 1975), the successive 
pieces of legislation – providing protection for new protected characteristics19 or 
extending the coverage of existing characteristics
20
 – have followed the general 
framework laid down by the SDA 1975, defining discrimination (and victimisation 
and, latterly, harassment) and then rendering it unlawful with regard to particular 
activities (depending on the scope of the Act or Regulations).
21
 Thus section 1(1) of 
the SDA 1975 defined discrimination as either less favourable treatment on grounds 
of the complainant’s sex (direct discrimination), or whereby the defendant applied 
something to both sexes but it adversely effected people of one sex and the defendant 
failed to establish that that adverse effect could be objectively justified (indirect 
                                                 
17
 Marriage (latterly joined by Civil Partnership) was protected under the seminal Sex Discrimination 
Act 1975 but it can hardly be considered to be a major protected characteristic given its rare use (see, 
eg J Hand, ‘The curious case of marriage/civil partnership discrimination in Britain’ (2012) IJDL 12(3) 
166). 
18
 The nine pieces being the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA 1975), Equal Pay Act 1970, Race 
Relations Act 1976 (RRA 1976), Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA 1995), Employment 
Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 (RB Regs 2003), Employment Equality (Sexual 
Orientation) Regulations 2003 (SO Regs 2003), Equality Act 2006, Employment Equality (Age) 
Regulations 2006 (Age Regs 2006) and Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 (SO Regs 
2007). 
19
 Such as the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006. 
20
 Such as the Equality Act 2006 extending the protection from religion or belief discrimination to the 
provision of goods and services. 
21
 The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 adopted a different template (and had different aims) but 
nonetheless still defined discrimination and then outlawed certain activities.  
  
discrimination). Subsequent sections rendered it unlawful to discriminate in, for 
example, offering employment (s.6(1)), dismissing someone (s.6(2)), providing 
education (s.22), providing goods and services (s.29), and so forth. While the 
framework was general there were a number of differences in definitions and scope, 
due in no small part to the effect of European Law (see below). These differences 
included, for example, the definition of direct discrimination for sex and age adopting 
a claimant-specific formulation (e.g. on grounds of her sex) whereas for race, religion 
or belief and sexual orientation the less favourable treatment did not have to be 
because of the claimant’s own characteristic (and thus allowed claims by association 
or due to perception). There were also myriad precise definitions of indirect 
discrimination (but to the broad effect given above) and, in the case of religion or 
belief and sexual orientation, protection was spread over two pieces of legislation 
each (drafted using different indirect discrimination terminology). The Equality Act 
2010 has brought a welcome rationalisation of definitions while retaining the general 
framework with the definitions of prohibited conduct followed by the prohibitions in 
the areas of goods, facilities, services and public functions (Part 3), premises (Part 4), 
work (Part 5), education (Part 6) and associations (Part 7).
22
  
The province of tort over the Equality Act 2010, and the predecessor 
legislation, is clear. The various pieces of legislation explicitly made clear that in the 
non-employment cases, a claim ‘may be made the subject of civil proceedings in like 
manner as any other claim in tort or (in Scotland) in reparation for breach of statutory 
duty’.23 While it is true that employment related claims – which are by far the most 
litigated – are reserved to the Employment Tribunal rather than a typical tortious 
                                                 
22
 While Pt 3 is titled ‘Services and Public Functions’, s 31(2) makes clear that this includes goods and 
facilities. 
23
 Sex Discrimination Act 1975, s 66; claims were, and are, restricted to the County (or Sheriffs’) 
courts but with all remedies as would be available in the High Court or the Court of Session (s 66(2)). 
  
jurisdiction,
24
 the provisions regulating compensation for wrongs in employment 
explicitly refer to the non-employment provision (such as that quoted above) and it is 
‘well established’ that for the purposes of compensation they should be treated as a 
claim in tort.
25
 The Equality Act 2010, for the most part, consolidates the previous law 
and continues to define compensation for non-employment and employment-related 
discrimination in this way, although it now says that the county court has power to 
grant any remedy which could be granted in the High Court in proceedings in tort 
rather than, as formerly, referring to ‘any other claim in tort’.26 
One area where the Equality Act 2010 initially developed the law is with 
regard to liability for harassment. Harassment may constitute a crime or a tort (and, 
indeed, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (PHA 1997) created both a criminal 
offence and a civil action) but it could also lead to an action for discrimination. A 
statutory definition and action of harassment within the anti-discrimination legislation 
was introduced in 2003
27
 but prior to this actions were brought under direct 
discrimination. In either case, the harassment or less favourable treatment had to be on 
grounds of the protected characteristic (be it ‘her sex’, ‘religion or belief’, ‘racial 
grounds’, etc.), but could afford greater protection than the PHA 1997 as there was no 
                                                 
24
 Eg Sex Discrimination Act 1975, s 63(1). 
25
 See eg Alexander v Home Office [1988] 1 WLR 968, 975; Essa v Laing [2004] ICR 746 [36]-[39], 
[62], [117]; Abbey National Plc v Chagger [2009] ICR 624, [87]-[88], EAT. In Chagger v Abbey 
National Plc [2010] ICR 397, CA, Elias LJ referred to the claim being ‘akin to a tort’ at [11] despite 
the wording and precedence but to no effect. This can be contrasted with unfair dismissal: ‘By contrast, 
the right not to be unfairly dismissed, with which Polkey was concerned, is a sui generis statutory right, 
the breach of which is not classifiable as a tort’ (Abbey National Plc v Chagger [2009] ICR 624 at [87]-
[88]).  
26
 Ss 119 and 124(6) Equality Act 2010. 
27
 With s 3A inserted into the Race Relations Act 1976 by reg 5 of the Race Relations Act 1976 
(Amendment) Regulations 2003/1626; this was followed by the coming into force of the Employment 
Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2003. Section 3B of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 was introduced in 2004 by reg 
4(2) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (Amendment) Regulations 2003/1673with s 4A Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 being inserted a year later by reg 5 of the Employment Equality (Sex 
Discrimination) Regulations 2005/2467. 
  
requirement for a course of conduct.
28
 There will be further discussion of the 
definition below, under the EC/EU Law heading, as it was subject to judicial review, 
but of a particular note here is the liability of employers. In the late 1990s, the Court 
of Appeal held the liability of employers under the discrimination legislation was 
different from that under the common law or by extension the PHA 1997 (which uses 
common law vicarious liability).
29
 The discrimination legislation’s use of the words 
‘whether or not it was done with the employer’s knowledge or approval’, within the 
provision conferring liability on the employer, placed a higher level of responsibility 
than at common law, as did the presence of the ‘reasonable steps defence’ in such 
provisions (otherwise the defence would mean that there was less protection in the 
discrimination statutes). There was also the concern that the common law test would 
mean that the more abhorant the act, the less likely the employer would be liable and 
thus the more likely the complainant would be unable to seek recompense. The 
subsequent change to the common law wrought by Lister v Hesley Hall
30
 brought the 
two closer together but the two were set to diverge again when the Equality Act 2010, 
building on an amendment to the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, sought to make 
employers liable for the acts of third parties across the protected characteristics (but 
only where the employee had suffered such harassment at least twice before and the 
employer had failed to take reasonable steps).
31
 The Coalition Government, however, 
have now repealed this provision.
32
  
                                                 
28
 See eg Bracebridge Engineering v Darby [1990] IRLR 3, Insitu Cleaning Company Ltd v Heads 
[1995] IRLR 4. 
29
 Jones v Tower Boot [1997] 2 All ER 40. For the PHA see Majrowski v Guy’s & St. Thomas’s NHS 
Trust [2005] EWCA Civ 251; B Barrett, ‘The Protection from Harassment Act enters the workplace’ 
(2005) 34 ILJ 261. 
30
 [2002] 1 AC 215. 
31
 Equality Act 2010, s 40(2)-(4). 
32
 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, s 65. 
  
Alongside the prohibitory, retrospective approach in outlawing discrimination 
and harassment, three of the prior pieces of legislation latterly imposed positive duties 
on public authorities.
33
 These provisions laid out a general positive duty on public 
authorities to have due regard, when exercising their functions, to the need to 
eliminate unlawful discrimination and promote equality of opportunity with regard to 
Race, Disability and Sex. They also provided for specific duties designed to help the 
authorities meet their general duty. While the provisions were similar in concept there 
were various differences in structure and substance, with the racial duty taking a more 
prescriptive approach and imposing a wider duty encompassing the fostering of good 
relations alongside the promotion of equality of opportunity. The Equality Act 2010 
has extended the duty across all the protected characteristics,
34
 adopting the broader 
scope of the RRA 1976 but with an even lighter touch than that required formerly by 
the SDA, omitting ‘many of the detailed publication requirements’ and rendering the 
duties ‘significantly less bureaucratic’.35 Since its inception, only the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission has had the power to bring proceedings to enforce the 
specific duties,
36
 but the Equality Act 2010 has brought welcome clarification 
regarding the general duty. There was previously the untested possibility that the Race 
and Disability duties might give rise to a tortious action for breach of statutory duty 
                                                 
33
 Race Relations Act 1976, s 71 (inserted in 2000), Disability Discrimination Act 1995, s 49A 
(inserted in 2006), Sex Discrimination Ac 1975, s 76A (inserted in 2007).  
34
 With the partial exception of Marriage/Civil Partnership which is excepted from the duty regarding 
advancing equality and fostering good relations (‘relevant protected characteristics’ for s 149(1)(b) & 
(c) omitting that characteristic (by virtue of s 149(7)). 
35
 Explanatory Memorandum to The Equality Act 2010 (Specific Duties) Regulations 2011 (para 7.3). 
The new specific duties can be summarized as requiring public authorities to ‘prepare and publish [one 
or more] objectives, setting out what they intend to achieve in order to further the aims of the duty, and 
to publish information demonstrating their compliance with the duty.’ (para 2.3 of the Explanatory 
Memorandum) . The Race Relations Act 1976’s detailed data collection and the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995’s requirement to involve disabled people in the creation of the equality 
scheme have been removed and the express requirement to publish details of engagement with 
interested parties dropped following consultation. 
36
 Equality Act 2006, s 32(11) (as amended 5 April 2011). 
  
but the 2010 Act follows the SDA in explicitly stating that the duties do not confer a 
cause of action at private law.
37
 
 
The Equality Act 2010 and Property Law 
 
Property Law is most closely engaged with the Equality Act 2010 through Part 4 of 
the Act ‘Premises’, one of the five parts outlawing discrimination by rendering it a 
tort. Under the old law, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the Race Relations Act 
1976 contained premises-related provisions within the broader Goods, Services, 
Facilities heading. Now, a distinct six section part prohibits discrimination in the 
disposal and management of premises and requires disability-related reasonable 
adjustments to be made.
38
 However, there also other areas which may have an impact 
on those dealing with property. 
Indeed, the most high profile area currently where equality issues are 
associated with premises does not fall under Part 4 but what is now Part 3, the 
provision of services. Formerly, section 29 of the SDA, for example, provided 
examples of facilities and services and specifically included ‘accommodation in a 
hotel, boarding house or other similar establishment’.39 While the corresponding 
provision in the Equality Act 2010 (also s.29) does not provide any such examples, 
section 32(3) holds that ‘Part [4] does not apply to the provision of accommodation if 
the provision— (a) is generally for the purpose of short stays by individuals who live 
elsewhere’. Thus bed and breakfast accommodation and the controversy over 
homosexual couples being prohibited, by devoutly religious owners, from having a 
                                                 
37
Equality Act 2010, s 156; Mark Bell provides a detailed account of enforceability of the positive 
duties in 'Judicial enforcement of the duties on public authorities to promote equality' [2010] Public 
Law 67. 
38
 Equality Act 2010, ss 32-38; with specific exceptions in schs 4 and 5. 
39
 Sex Discrimination Act 1975, s 29(2)(b). 
  
double bed is unlawfully discriminatory under Part 3.
40
 There has been some attempt 
to deny that bed and breakfasts amount to a boarding house or similar establishment 
as the number of meals provided in the former is less but this has been given short 
shrift by the courts.
41
 However, there is a peculiarity in that the Premises provisions 
include a small premises exception whereby if the premises are sufficiently small
42
 
then some prohibitions regarding premises, such as offering a right to occupy, do not 
apply (unless the characteristic is race).
43
 Accordingly, where accommodation is 
provided to those who do not ‘live elsewhere’ the exception could be relied on 
whereas letting out rooms in the same size of property to those who are on holiday 
does not fall within this limited exception.
44
 This seems to give greater protection to 
holidaymakers than those in need of accommodation. 
One area within Part 4 where the Equality Act 2010 has seen new law being  
introduced, but no yet brought into force, concerns the duty to make reasonable 
adjustments for disabled people. The requirement under the old Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995 has been extended to cover common parts of leasehold 
premises
45
 and Schedule 4, para 7(4) holds that if an agreement regarding such 
adjustments is made ‘A's obligations under the agreement become part of A's interest 
in the common parts and pass on subsequent disposals accordingly.’  
The Act is silent on how the agreement will bind the land and afford effective 
protection. The Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 makes clear that collateral 
                                                 
40
 Bull v Hall [2013] UKSC 73, [2013] 1 WLR; Black and Morgan v Wilkinson [2013] EWCA Civ 820, 
[2013] 1 WLR 2490. 
41
 Black and Morgan v Wilkinson [2013] EWCA Civ 820, [2013] 1 WLR 2490 at [9] – [13]. 
42
 Where the D and his/her household reside in one part and the other part is not sufficient to provide 
accommodation to more than 6 other people comprising no more than two other households (sch 5, 
para 3). 
43
 Equality Act 2010, ss 33(1) and 35(1) prohibiting discrimination in the disposal of and management 
of premises, s 38(4) defining disposal and sch 5, para 3(2) excluding race. 
44
 The Chymorvah private hotel in Bull v Hall would fall outside the exception as it has seven guest 
rooms ([2013] 1 WLR, [59]) whereas the Swiss Bed & Breakfast in Black and Morgan has only 3 guest 
rooms ([2013] 1 WLR 2490, [1]). 
45
 Equality Act 2010, s 36(1)(d). 
  
agreements, whether they are made before or after the creation of the lease, are to be 
treated like any other covenant and this may be the mechanism.
46
 
Alternatively, it might be simply that the agreements will bind because paragraph 7(4) 
of Schedule 4 says they will. There is a lack of clarity here which may be among the 
reasons, along with practical difficulties, why the provision is among the few that 
have yet to be brought into force. Likewise, in order for the agreement to be noted on 
the land register, it would need to be established that the agreements in respect of 
common areas are ‘interests’ for the purposes of s.32 of Land Registration Act 2002 
and that the exclusion of restrictive covenants should be read as allowing positive 
covenants to be protected. It may well be that there will be other changes introduced 
(perhaps to the Land Registration Rules 2003) which will clarify the situation rather 
than having clarified the situation at source. 
  A further provision, this time abolishing a legal principle but again not yet in 
force, is section 199 – the abolition of the presumption of advancement. The nature 
and scope of the presumption is not without ambiguity, but the explanatory notes state 
that the presumption is ‘a presumption that a man who transfers property to his wife, 
child or fiancée is making the recipient a gift of that property, unless there was 
evidence to the contrary’,47 whereas there is no such presumption when the transferor 
is a woman. The presumption has been criticized as belonging to a different era
48
 and 
it is clearly sex discriminatory but there were alternatives to abolition. As Lord 
Walker and Baroness Hale put it in Kernot v Jones, that ‘that problem might have 
                                                 
46
 s 28. The same approach will be taken with pre-1995 Act leases (see System Floors Limited  
v Ruralpride Limited [1995] 1 EGLR 48 CA). 
47
 The Explanatory Notes to The Equality Act 2010, 624. 
48
 See, most famously, Lord Diplock in Petitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777, 824c who considered it to be ‘an 
abuse of the legal technique for ascertaining or imputing intention to apply to transactions between the 
post-war generation of married couples "presumptions" which are based upon inferences of fact which 
an earlier generation of judges drew as to the most likely intentions of earlier generations of spouses 
belonging to the propertied classes of a different social era’. 
  
been solved had equity been able to extend the presumption of  advancement to 
unmarried couples and remove the sex discrimination [but] the tool which equity has 
chosen to develop law is the “common intention” constructive trust’. 49 In other 
jurisdictions, the presumption has been taken to include mothers as well as fathers,
50
 
although it has been removed between spouses.
51
 A non-discriminatory amendment 
could have been passed in place of abolition, as happened with regard to the Married 
Women’s Property Act 1964 (section 200 of the Equality Act 2010 if brought into 
force will see it transform into the Matrimonial Property Act 1964 wherein money and 
property derived from housekeeping money is shared equally whether the money 
came from husband to wife or wife to husband or indeed between civil partners). 
However, as Brightwell notes, ‘‘the change was made with no parliamentary debate, 
following the introduction of an amendment during the passage of the Act in the 
House of Lords’.52 The undue haste with which this amendment was made has to 
some extent, albeit less satisfactorily, been mitigated by the pronounced delay in 
deciding whether to bring it into force. 
 
The Equality Act 2010 and Equity 
 
The common law freedom to discriminate in disposition by gift or trust has, as 
Gardiner notes, generally been left untouched by the anti-discrimination legislation.
53
 
Lord Wilberforce’s dicta from 1975 that:  
                                                 
49
 [2011] UKSC 53, [24]. 
50
 See eg strong obiter in  Pecore v Pecore, 2007 SCC 17 (CanLII), [2007] 1 SCR 795, [31] – [41] 
regarding infant children, Antoni v Antoni [2007] UKPC 10, [20] (parent and child), Anderson v 
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Discrimination is not the same thing as choice: it operates over a larger and 
less personal area, and neither by express provision nor by implication has 
private selection yet become a matter of public policy,
54
 
remains unchallenged in case law and by statute, it being applied well into the anti-
discrimination law era,
55
. While Harding maintains that the common law could, in 
fact, eliminate such discriminatory trusts – either where a non-discrimination norm 
operates at a constitutional level or through application of Razian autonomy and the 
collective good
56
 – Parliament has not opted not to do so through statute law.  
Nevertheless, the Equality Act 2010 engages with the law of equity and trusts 
in a number of, albeit relatively minor, ways. Alongside the Act’s late-inserted and ill-
scrutinized abolition of the presumption of advancement (discussed above), the Act 
also harmonizes the limited incursion into the private sphere, regarding private 
associations, and amends the previous provisions regarding charities.  
Previously, private associations were prohibited from discriminating against 
members only with regard to race, disability and sexual orientation. The general 
prohibition against discriminating in the provision of goods and services, such as that 
in section 29 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, did not apply to private associations 
as the section was limited to provision ‘to the public or a section of the public’ and 
only the Race Relations Act 1976, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and the 
Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 contained separate provision 
governing private associations (but only those whose membership was 25 or more and 
whose rules regulated admission to membership and involved a process of 
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selection).
57
  The Equality Act 2010 extends this protection to the other protected 
characteristics (with the usual exception of marriage and civil partnership) and 
extends the protection for guests, previously only available with regard to disability, 
across the same characteristics.
58
 Thus a private members club who has members 
from both sexes must treat them equally but, under schedule 16, they may restrict 
membership to persons who share a protected characteristic. 
The previous provisions allowing charities a partial exemption have been 
clarified, harmonized and extended beyond sex, race, sexual orientation and religion 
or belief to also cover disability and age (and, although the explanatory notes omit 
reference to them, it would appear also to gender reassignment and pregnancy and 
maternity). Thus charities may restrict the provision of benefits to persons who share 
a protected characteristic as long as they act in pursuance of a charitable instrument, 
and the provision of the benefits is either for the purpose of preventing or 
compensating for a disadvantage linked to the protected characteristic or is otherwise 
a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
59
 The Charity Commission 
consider this explicit requirement on charities to justify restrictions to be the key 
difference under the new Act (previously only the SDA explicitly contained such a 
requirement following an amendment in 2008)
60
 but there are a couple of other new 
subsections worthy of note. Firstly, under section 193(5), charities may require 
members to make a statement which asserts or implies membership or acceptance of a 
religion or belief (but only if the charity imposed such a requirement before 18 May 
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2005).
61
 This may allow some protection for religious charities but it is clearly, and 
peculiarly, limited.
62
 Secondly, section 193(7) makes clear that, for example, all-
woman fundraising events (such as the Race for Life used to support Cancer Research 
UK) do not contravene section 29. This only applies to sex, however, and so, while 
all-homosexual groups or French groups are permitted under Schedule 16, a fund-
raising event limited to the wider all-homosexual or, for example, French community 
is not. 
 
 The Equality Act 2010 and Public Law 
 
Public Law can be an amorphous concept. As Lord Diplock noted in O'Reilly v 
Mackman ‘the appreciation of the distinction in substantive law between what is 
private law and what is public law has itself been a latecomer to the English legal 
system.’63 It can relate to all law that deals with the relationships between the 
individual and the State (and thus embrace criminal law) or more narrowly be 
shorthand for constitutional and administrative law or even solely administrative law, 
which is the sense in which Lord Diplock used it.
64
 The declaration of the seven 
foundations of legal knowledge includes criminal law as one of the seven and 
                                                 
61
 Equality Act 2010, s 193(6)(a). 
62
 it would appear unlikely on the facts to avail any help to the Catholic adoption agency in Catholic 
Care (Diocese of Leeds) v Charity Commission for England and Wales & Anor [2010] EWHC 520, 
[2010] 4 All ER 1041 who sought to rely on the exemption in the SO Regs 2007 by seeking to amend 
their instrument of government. 
63
 [1983] 2 AC 237, 277. 
64
 For a further example see JWF Allison in A Continental Distinction in the Common Law: A 
Historical and Comparative Perspective on English Public Law (OUP 2000) where he focused on 
‘public law in the sense of administrative law – the law relating to administrative authorities, powers, 
or functions’ and excluded ‘discussion of constitutional law as such and its relationship with private 
law’ (p 3). 
  
adumbrates public law as including ‘Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and 
Human Rights’65 and it is in that context in which it is used here. 
The Equality Act 2010 falls within the embrace of Public Law in a number of 
ways. Not only does it refine a core concept underpinning the law, both public and 
private, but discrimination within the provision of public services is among the 
specified areas where discrimination is prohibited as a statutory tort (unless subject to 
exceptions).
66
 In this respect it has harmonized the pre-existing provisions and 
extended the scope so that discrimination in the exercise of public functions because 
of pregnancy and maternity, because of a person’s gender reassignment and, two 
years after the Act’s initial commencement, because of a person’s age are all now 
covered. The Act has also, as noted in the section on Tort above, expanded and 
harmonized the positive duties on public authorities across the protected 
characteristics and introduced the further, currently unimplemented, duty to take 
account of socio-economic inequalities.
67
 Furthermore, the Equality Act 2010 falls 
within the primarily administrative remedy of judicial review not only with regard to 
the enforcement of these duties but also, as discussed in the section on EU law, where 
the law fails to adequately implement EU directives.  
It also occupies some of the same ground as the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR). There are, 
however, clear distinctions between the two. For example, the ECHR discrimination 
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provisions do not include the direct and indirect dichotomy that is a hallmark of the 
British and EU approach
68
 and the ECHR uses an open list approach to protected 
characteristics as opposed to the exhaustive list set forth in section 4 of the Equality 
Act 2010.
69
 Furthermore, as far as the UK is concerned, it has a much narrower scope 
as the prohibition against discrimination only relates to discrimination in the 
enjoyment of other convention rights rather than being a freestanding right in itself.
70
 
Nonetheless, the Equality Act 2010, like its predecessor legislation, operate in 
overlapping spheres with the ECHR and British law has, for example, borrowed from 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights when it comes to the 
definition of religion and belief, the drafters of the Equality Act 2010 and the earlier 
legislation having declined to define it.
71
 
The Act also has some significance to constitutional law, not simply because it 
is an Act of Parliament but because of the circumstances of its passage into law. 
Despite the novelty of interleaving the explanatory notes with the Bill so as to aid user 
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engagement, and it being a still rare example of a Bill introduced into one session of 
Parliament and then carried over into the following one, the scrutiny the Bill received 
was somewhat wanting. While Hepple asserts that the Act ‘was the product of intense 
and detailed scrutiny in Parliament over a period of nearly a year’, with the House of 
Commons Public Bill committee taking 38 hours and the Commons Report stage a 
further 5½ hours,
72
 parliamentarians in both chambers lamented the lack of time 
available for proper scrutiny with one noting that ‘the Leader of the House will go 
down in history as having organized things in such a way that more amendments and 
new clauses than ever before have fallen without scrutiny in this place.’73 This lack of 
scrutiny is evident in subsequent amendments, not just regarding the change from EC 
to EU law mentioned above
74
 but also to do such things as ‘correct inadvertent 
omissions to ensure that… provisions of the 2010 Act work effectively in Scotland as 
well as England and Wales’,75 remove an ambiguity concerning the duty to make 
reasonable adjustments for disabled persons where relationships have come to an 
end
76
 and ensure that complainants’ solicitors may continue to advise as to 
compromise agreements (following considerable clamour as the original wording 
unintentionally risked making such agreements unreliable).
77
  It can furthermore be 
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seen in such legislative peculiarities as the status of pregnancy/maternity 
discrimination. While that protected characteristic has its own dedicated provisions in 
sections 17 and 18 and it is the one characteristic explicitly excluded from the indirect 
discrimination provision, there is no such exclusion from the definition of direct 
discrimination within section 13. However, section 25 sets out in one place what is 
meant by references to particular strands of discrimination and while it refers to 
sections 13 and 19 for all the other grounds it mentions only sections 17 and 18 for 
pregnancy/maternity. Thus if section 25 is taken to be authoritative, the Act on the 
face of the section explicitly limits one crucial concept (that of indirect 
discrimination) from applying to pregnancy discrimination but implicitly limits it 
from applying to another (direct discrimination). As other sections – such as those 
defining and prohibiting harassment – explicitly delimit their application such 
omission from section 13 would be highly curious, at least. If section 25 is mere 
guidance, then such ambiguous guidance is of little worth. Either way, here as with 
other areas, further legislative scrutiny could have clarified the drafting and 
intention.
78
  
 
The Equality Act 2010 and EC/EU law 
 
British discrimination law has both national and European origins. British 
discrimination law has developed endogenously – covering areas which EU law was 
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slower to embrace such as the grounds of race and disability and the provision of 
goods and services – as well as being subject to European Law, which gave rise both 
to the introduction of new provisions (such as the grounds of sexual orientation and 
religion or belief and the introduction of distinct harassment provisions) and the 
frequent amendment of existing ones. This disparate development caused there to be 
no fewer than three definitions of indirect discrimination in force in British law for a 
time, with the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and Race Relations Act 1976 both 
containing two active definitions. This was due to the operation of section 2(2) of the 
European Communities Act 1972, the mechanism by which the EC Directives were 
transposed into national law. It left the original definitions of discrimination to apply 
to areas outside EC law but given the different trajectories of the two overlapping 
jurisdictions the definitions applied to different matters within the two Acts. 
Accordingly, the EU definition applied solely to the field of employment within the 
SDA (until it was extended to goods and services in 2008)
79
 but applied across the 
fields in the RRA 1976 but only with regard to the sub-grounds of race, national and 
ethnic origin with the original national definition remaining for colour and nationality. 
Furthermore, following the EC broadening the scope of its anti-discrimination 
legislation the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 was subject to radical amendment 
rendering it an extreme alphabet-soup of inserted sections (with sections 3 – 7 
(excluding section 5 which was repealed in 2004), 14, 16 – 18, 21, 22, 24, 28, 31, etc. 
all having lettered sections inserted after them including section 28UA-UC inserted 
after section 28U and even sections 31ADA and 31ADB). The Equality Act 2010 has 
certainly rationalized the legislation in these respects.  
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The doctrine of indirect effect, requiring domestic law to be interpreted so far 
as possible in such a way that it complies with relevant Directives,
80
 and to challenge 
by judicial review if it does not adequately reflect European law, can also be seen in 
the jurisprudence surrounding equality law (both forming the background for, and 
already playing a part in jurisprudence on, the Equality Act 2010). An extreme 
example of such judicial interpretation can be seen in EBR Attridge Law LLP & Anor 
v Coleman,
81
 where entire subsections were implied into the Disability Discrimination 
Act 1995 so as to bring it into compliance with EU law regarding the protection of 
carers.
82
 The Equality Act 2010 no longer requires such considerable indirect ‘reading 
in’ as the unified direct discrimination definition allows such associative claims. With 
regard to judicial review, one such review, concerning the definition of harassment 
within the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, led to one of the few novel and controversial 
provisions in the Equality Act 2010. In Equal Opportunities Commission v Secretary 
of State for Trade and Industry,
83
 the EOC sought, among other things, to show that 
the Sex Discrimination Act’s use of ‘on the grounds of her sex’ did not adequately 
transpose the directive which refers to ‘conduct related to the sex of a person’ and that 
the legislation failed to implement the Directive in not introducing or enabling 
employers’ liability for the acts of third parties. While Burton J agreed that the 
definition section needed to be recast to remove both the causation, or as he put it the 
‘ratiocination’, element and the limitation to the complainant’s own sex, he 
considered that the introduction of liability arising from the acts of third parties would 
be a consequence of such a change rather than something explicitly or implicitly 
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mandated by the directive.
84
 However, when the government amended the SDA 1975 
they not only changed the wording of the definition but also introduced a separate 
provision making employers liable where they had failed to take reasonable steps and 
were aware that an employer had been harassed on more than two occasions by a third 
party. This provision was expanded across the seven relevant protected characteristics 
for harassment in the Equality Act 2010 but the coalition government considered the 
provision to be unworkable and an unnecessary burden on business and repealed it in 
2013.
85
  
A concept of European law is arguably directly responsible for a further 
peculiarity of harassment within the Equality Act 2010. While there are nine protected 
characteristics detailed in section 4, and seven relevant protected characteristics for 
harassment,
86
 when it comes to the prohibition of harassment in such areas as the 
provision of goods and services the number falls to five.
87
 The protected 
characteristics of pregnancy/maternity and marriage/civil partnership are excluded 
from the definition of harassment, the government being of the view that any 
pregnancy or maternity harassment would be ‘related to her sex’ in any case and that 
there was little or no evidence to justify the inclusion of harassment related to 
marriage or civil partnership.
88
 The further exclusion of religion or belief and sexual 
orientation from the list of relevant protected characteristics for harassment in the 
provision of good and services (and in such areas as housing, education and public 
services) is, however, due to concerns of incompatibility with freedom of expression 
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and manifesting religious belief due to specific ground and area concerns (with 
examples including booksellers censoring books, restraining proselytizing landlords 
and impeding the explanation of sincerely held beliefs for fear of merely creating an 
offensive environment).
89
 This fear of incompatibility is in turn due to the British 
government, when implementing the Race Directive, adopting a disjunctive approach, 
rather than the directive’s conjunctive approach, in the definition of harassment 
because of previous British case law and the European concept of non-regression. 
Many pieces of European legislation covering employment rights contain a ‘non-
regression’ clause preventing member states from ‘leveling-down’ or using the 
implementation of European law as an excuse to reduce the protection they previously 
offered.
90
 The government, when consulting on the implementation of the Race and 
Equality Directives back in 2001, noted that ‘Employment Tribunals normally define 
harassment [within direct discrimination] as unwanted conduct of a racial or sexual 
nature or other conduct based on race or sex affecting the dignity of men and women 
at work’.91 They thus considered that the statutory definition of harassment, with 
regard to Race and Sex, must include the disjunctive ‘or’ rather than the directives’ 
‘and’ when defining harassment (the chosen formulation being unwanted conduct 
with the purpose or effect of a) violating a person’s dignity or b) creating an 
                                                 
89
 Department for Communities and Local Government, Discrimination Law Review - A Framework 
for Fairness: Proposals for a Single Equality Bill for Great Britain (2007), para 14.17; HL Deb 9 
November 2005, vol 675, cols 648 – 653 (Lord Lester); Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative 
Scrutiny: Equality Bill (Twenty-Sixth Report of 2008/2009) para 112; Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Sexual Orientation Regulations (Sixth Report of Session 2006-07), paras 
56-58. 
90
 Eg Article 6(2) of Council Directive 2000/43/EC (the Race Directive) holding that ‘The 
implementation of this Directive shall under no circumstances constitute grounds for a reduction in the 
level of protection against discrimination already afforded by Member States in the fields covered by 
this Directive’. See also Article 8(2) of Council Directive 2000/78 (the Framework Equality Directive); 
Clause 8(3) of the Annex to Council Directive 1999/70/EC (the Fixed-Term Workers Directive); 
Clause 6(2) of the Annex to Council Directive 97/81/EC (the Part-Time Workers Directive). 
91
 Cabinet Office, DTI, Home Office and DWP, Towards Equality and Diversity: Implementing the 
Employment and Race Directives (December 2001) para 6.3; such wording being based on the EC 
Recommendation and Code of Practice on measures to combat sexual harassment at work 
(91/131/EEC) (adopted in GB by Reed & anor v Stedman [1999] IRLR 299, EAT). 
  
intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment). This 
argument carried through to the Equality Act with the Solicitor General saying in 
committee that  
To use the conjunctive approach—the European approach, which is perhaps 
slightly narrower—would be regression. We would be going back from what 
we have already done and we are not allowed to do that under the principle of 
non-regression.
92
 
There is, however, some argument against this proposition. Firstly, when 
implementing the Framework Employment Equality Directive, as Barmes notes 
‘[t]here was, quite simply, no pre-existing UK law on age, religion and belief or 
sexual orientation [with] which to compare the Employment Directive’ and thus no 
danger of regression.
93
 The choice was open to adopt differences in definition to 
reflect the differences in characteristic or activity (for example, deleting some of the 
lesser adjectives regarding the atmosphere whilst retaining protection from the more 
serious ones)
94
 but it was decided to opt for a binary consistency or nothing.
95
 
Furthermore, the non-regression clause holds that implementation of the directive 
shall not constitute grounds for a reduction in the level of protection but does not 
necessarily act as a standstill (which would prevent the reduction of standards 
absolutely).
96
 Whilst it is clear that implementation may take place on more than one 
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occasion,
97
 there may be room to argue that a change in definition seeks to better 
observe ECHR provisions rather than implement the directive.
98
 Barmes maintains 
that the original decision to adopt the disjunctive approach was flawed as the pre-
existing national law, as clarified by Pearce v Governing Body of Mayfield School
99
, 
did not require it
100
 but, notwithstanding the earlier position, having now legislated it 
is apparent that the extant provisions are subject to the prohibition of regression with 
regard to implementation.
101
 Barmes also raised the intriguing prospect of the 
harassment provisions being ultra vires as they were transposed into national law 
through secondary legislation under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 
1972 which may not allow for a more generous definition than required under EU 
law.
102
 This is at least something that the Equality Act 2010, being primary 
legislation, has resolved. 
The principle laid down in Van-Gend en Loos
103
 that EU law is supreme 
(within its seemingly ever-increasing cognisance) has meant that the Act of 2010 has 
already been seen to need amendment. Some amendments are of little consequence, 
such as replacing references to ‘Community law’ with ‘EU law’ belatedly recognising 
the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European 
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Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community,
104
 while others are of 
greater significance. The striking down by the ECJ of Article 5(2) of the Gender 
Directive (2004/113/EC), which allowed member states, if supported by genuine 
statistical data, to derogate from the principle that insurers should not use gender as a 
risk factor, in Test-Achats
105
 has caused the government to reluctantly consult on 
deleting paragraph 22 of Schedule 3 to the Act which implemented Article 5(2) into 
national law despite the judgment going ‘against the grain of the common sense 
approach to equality which the UK Government want to see’.106 The House of 
Commons European Scrutiny Committee noted that ‘there is no scope for the 
Government to challenge the ECJ judgement’ and recognized that ‘it is not 
compatible with the UK's attachment to the rule of law to ignore the judgement’.107 
Potential future challenges could arise regarding the ‘occupational requirement’ 
provisions. Schedule 9 provides for occasions when the prohibition on discrimination 
in employment is disapplied where there is a justifiable occupational requirement for 
somebody to have – or not have – a particular protected characteristic. The second 
paragraph concerns employment for the purposes of an organized religion whereby an 
employer may require a person to be of a particular sex, sexual orientation or marital 
state if such a requirement is so as to comply with the doctrines of that religion or so 
as to avoid conflicting with the strongly held religious convictions of a significant 
number of the religion's followers. As Pitt notes this may be subject to challenge as a 
‘reasoned opinion from the European Commission in 2009 suggested that this 
exemption is too broad to be compatible with the Framework Directive’ and yet 
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changes to the definition were voted down in the House of Lords.
108
 The third 
paragraph specifically covers employers with an ethos based on religion or belief and 
provides that they may apply ‘in relation to work a requirement to be of a particular 
religion or belief’ if they can show that, ‘having regard to that ethos and to the nature 
or context of the work’ it is an occupational requirement, its application constitutes a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim and that the person subject to the 
requirement either does not meet it or the employer has reasonable grounds for not 
being satisfied that the person meets it. Hepple contends that ‘this does not accurately 
reflect the directive’ which requires more than ‘having regard’ to the nature or context 
of the work.
109
 A further opportunity missed in the Equality Act 2010 was continuing 
to exempt Sections 58-60 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 from the 
prohibition on discrimination (this appears in Schedule 22(4) rather than Schedule 9 
but has similar effect with regard to restricting certain employees to a particular 
religion). The Joint Committee on Human Rights considered there were ‘substantial 
grounds’ for doubting whether those sections ‘as currently framed are compatible with 
the requirements of Article 4(2) of the Framework Equality Directive 2000/78/EC’.110 
Doubts which, as McColgan puts it, ‘appear to have fallen on deaf ears’.111 
 
The Equality Act 2010 and criminal law 
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While the Equality Act’s enforcement mechanism is predominantly tortious in nature, 
and criminal law primarily combats discriminatory behaviour through public order 
and disorder legislation,
112
 the Equality Act not only replicates some, albeit limited, 
criminal offences from the predecessor legislation but has highlighted their presence 
and sought to add them along with having a general regulatory effect on the criminal 
litigation process. 
The limited criminal sanction in the Equality Act follows practice established 
in the early days of anti- discrimination in the 1960s, even before the seminal model 
was established, where criminal sanctions were almost completely excluded from the 
Race Relations Acts 1965 and 1968.
113
 The arguments advanced in Cabinet 
discussions were that the primary means of eliminating discrimination should be a 
conciliation mechanism (or in some fields non-statutory consultation). It was feared 
that the prospect of criminal proceedings might exacerbate local tensions and 
prejudice conciliation, with the public/private divide being noted in the minutes: 
[t]he Bill already provided heavy criminal sanctions against incitement to 
racial hatred; but this was an offence against public order and must be 
differentiated from an infringement of personal rights of a kind which 
constituted a primarily civil complaint.
114
  
Nevertheless, there was still a view that the Government’s attitude should be that 
discriminatory conduct was so repugnant that it was right to regard it as a criminal 
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offence and this has carried over into limited offences. Clearly the criminal law was 
ultimately, and is, not seen as a significant tool in achieving the anti discrimination 
purpose of the general anti-discrimination legislation – or the promotion of equality. 
Nonetheless, like its predecessors the Equality Act does create specific criminal 
offences. These occur principally in Part 8 – titled Prohibited Conduct: Ancillary and 
Part 12 – Disabled Persons: Transport. Part 12 concerns taxi accessibility for 
wheelchair users, duties of taxi drivers carrying passengers in wheelchairs, carrying 
assistance dogs for blind people etc. It also gives the Secretary of State power to make 
regulations concerning the accessibility of Public Service Vehicles for disabled 
people. Failure to comply with regulations is punishable summarily by a fine usually 
at levels 3 or 4 on the standard scale.  
The ancillary prohibited conduct in Part 8 is very specifically targeted. Section 
110 imposes criminal liability on an employer or principal who knowingly or 
recklessly makes a false or misleading statement to an employee or agent to the effect 
that doing ‘something’ is not a contravention of the act. If the employee or agent then 
reasonably relies on that statement to do the ‘something’ then the employer or agent 
who made the statement commits a criminal offence punishable summarily by a fine 
not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale. Section 110 is complemented by section 
112. Under this section, if a person knowingly helps another to contravene various 
parts of the Act, and the help was rendered in reasonable reliance on a statement that 
what was done would not contravene the Act, but the statement was false or 
misleading, and the maker knew or was reckless that the statement was false or 
misleading, then the maker of the statement would again commit an offence 
punishable summarily by a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale. The effect 
of Part 8 is therefore to impose criminal liability on those in positions of power, 
  
authority or influence, who give incorrect assurances that people will not contravene 
the Act. Although the offences are summary, and the maximum punishment is a fine, 
the prospect of criminal conviction ought to operate personally upon those able to 
influence the behaviour of others. Nonetheless, and perhaps counter intuitively, 
according to Bindman, the imposition of wider criminal sanctions in the US to deter 
discriminatory behaviour was unsuccessful, leading to primarily administrative means 
in the US and Britain.
115
  
Finally, section 78 allows regulations to be made with require employers to 
publish gender pay gap information. Following the usual form of such provisions, 
section 78(5) provides that the regulations may also make failure to publish an offence 
punishable summarily by a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale. This 
section, and the prospect of criminal sanction in the event of a breach, should, if it 
were to have been brought into force, force employers to recognize where gender pay 
gaps exist. Identification of the problem should be the first step towards its 
elimination but currently, in an echo of the 1960s, the government are seeking to 
achieve equality here through non-statutory means.
116
  
Apart from the specific offences created by the Act, the tenor of enforcement 
follows the pattern set in the 1960s and seems to lie in the civil sphere with actions 
primarily being brought by individuals and others in the County Courts or the 
Employment Tribunal, although proceedings for judicial review, and those relating to 
immigration and education be brought in appropriate fora (see Part 9 - Enforcement). 
There is no mention of any criminal court. Indeed the Equality Act seems to draw a 
careful line between itself and criminal proceedings. Section 113(7) specifically 
excludes the application of Part 9 – Enforcement - to proceedings for an ‘offence’ 
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under the Act. Section 136, governing the burden of proof, specifically declares it 
does not apply to criminal proceedings brought under the Act (s136(5)) (in distinction 
to the predecessor sections),
117
 while section 119(7) prevents a county court from 
granting a remedy other than the award of damages or a declaration unless satisfied 
that no criminal matter would be prejudiced by doing so. Section 138 is an interesting 
provision which appears to be heavily influenced by the criminal law’s insistence on 
the privilege against self-incrimination. Effectively, the section requires a respondent 
to give information in answer to a question from a claimant. Failure to provide such 
information within 8 weeks of the question being asked allows the court or tribunal to 
draw an adverse inference by virtue of section 138(4). However, such an inference 
cannot be drawn if the failure to respond might have prejudiced a criminal matter or 
would have revealed the reason for not commencing or not continuing criminal 
proceedings (s138(5). Again, it seems as if the Act acknowledges criminal law 
principles but wishes to be insulated from them.  
 
The Equality Act 2010 and the Law of Contract 
 
British anti-discrimination law is primarily tortious but there are areas where contracts 
are either affected or utilized. Indeed, Part 10 of the Equality Act 2010 is titled 
‘Contracts, etc.’ and contains sections which render discriminatory terms 
unenforceable, but only so far as they have discriminatory effect,
118
 and which allow 
for such terms to be removed or modified.
119
 Furthermore, the torts themselves can be 
seen, on the surface, to infringe freedom of contract – depriving people of their 
ability, for example, to choose freely whom to employ or supply services to – 
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although there is a contrary body of thought that such prohibitions could in fact 
support freedom of contract,
120
 which, indeed, is ‘premised on the notion of equal 
parties’.121 While British anti-discrimination law does not use contract as tool to the 
same extent as in, for example, the European Draft Common Frame of Reference,
122
 
contract does feature notably in the areas of equal pay and the public sector duty. 
Under the previous legislation, the matters of equal pay (and other contractual 
terms) between the sexes, on the one hand, and of tortious discrimination, on the 
other, were dealt with by separate Acts. The Equal Pay Act 1970 and the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 were intended to form a harmonious code but used different 
mechanisms, whereas all the subsequent protected characteristics included pay and 
terms within the tortious prohibition of discrimination in employment. The Equal Pay 
Act 1970 sought to prevent disparate pay based on sex through implying, if not 
expressly included, an ‘equality clause’ into contracts of employment. This clause 
operated to modify any less favourable term in a woman’s contract (compared to a 
man’s and vice versa), and to include in the contract any beneficial term which 
appeared in the comparator’s contract but not hers, where the woman was employed 
on ‘like work’, ‘work rated as equivalent’ or ‘work of equal value’ with a man in the 
same employment.  
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The Equality Act 2010, despite the aim to simplify and clarify the law, retains 
this distinction and largely replicates the previous law, with Hepple lamenting that 
‘the legislation remains unnecessarily complex and to some extent unintelligible’.123 
The government decided to retain the distinction because, among other things, ‘the 
implied contractual equality provision provides a valuable guarantee to women in the 
workforce of their right to be employed on the same terms as men’.124 There are clear 
disadvantages to treating sex differently from the other protected characteristics: such 
as the blurred line between contractual and non-contractual benefits risking claims 
becoming inadmissible if brought under the wrong heading (if not brought in the 
alternative)
125
 and sex having a harsher requirement regarding comparators (as the 
others can use hypothetical comparators). There are, however, some benefits to using 
contract and 70% of the respondents to the government consultation favoured 
retaining the distinction. The difference in the nature of the claims is reflected in the 
time limits and remedies. Whereas those claiming under the employment tort have 
three months to bring any claim,
126
 a claimant bringing a contractual claim generally 
has six months from the ending of employment to bring a claim to the employment 
tribunal
127
 and if they are time-barred there then, unless the failure to bring the claim 
in the tribunal amounted to an abuse of process, they could issue a claim for breach of 
contract in the courts where the normal limitation period of six years applies.
128
 A 
corollary to this is that claims for equal pay being based in contract do not allow for 
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damages for injury to feelings, which are routinely recoverable in the tort, or for 
aggravated or exemplary damages.
129
 
In a step forward for transparency and aiding the fight for equality of pay, the 
Equality Act 2010 does contain a novel provision that limits the effect of pay 
‘gagging’ clauses. Section 77 provides that terms that purport to prevent or restrict a 
person from disclosing information about his or her terms or seeking disclosure from 
colleagues about theirs are unenforceable but only where the disclosure is for the 
purposes of discovering whether there is a link between the pay for that particular 
work and a protected characteristic. This was preferred to making pay audits 
mandatory, with EEF (the manufacturers’ organization) recording its members as 
being strongly against such audits considering them too expensive and burdensome 
and the government preferring to wait and see what impact voluntary audits have.
130
 
Similar fears as to expense and burden led to the public sector duties being 
made less bureaucratic. As noted above, the Equality Act 2010 saw the general duty 
on public authorities to have regard to the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination, 
promote equality of opportunity and foster good relations, expanded to cover all the 
protected characteristics but the accompanying specific duties were simplified.
131
 
Thus the government has not sought to use the power in section 155(2) that 
‘Regulations… may impose duties on a public authority that is a contracting authority 
within the meaning of the Public Sector Directive in connection with its public 
procurement functions’. However, the duty on public authorities can be carried 
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horizontally onto contracting businesses, where it is relevant and proportionate to do 
so, and as the public sector spends up to £175 billion
132
 through contracts with the 
private sector that could amount to significant leverage.
133
 The Equality and Human 
Rights Commission Guidance suggests including two contract conditions – 
prohibiting the contractor from unlawfully discriminating under the Equality Act 2010 
and requiring them to take all reasonable steps to ensure that staff, suppliers and sub-
contractors meet their obligations under the Act – which do no more than require 
them to act lawfully,
134
 but there is scope to go further ‘if the authority considers it 
necessary or expedient to do so to enable or facilitate compliance with a duty’.135 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article does not seek to suggest that equality law – however important and 
valuable a topic it might be – should become a foundation of legal knowledge in its 
own right in England and Wales (or elsewhere) but rather to show that the Equality 
Act 2010 and the jurisprudence around it are linked, to varying extents, to all the 
foundations. To this extent it suggests that the foundations, as currently understood, 
have some validity in educating practitioners and academic commentators in an area 
of law which has a high profile and a profound, often controversial effect on 
individuals and society. The exclusion of a subject from the list of foundations does 
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not necessarily render the subject less important, as they build on the foundations laid 
by the others. Of course, legal knowledge extends well beyond the foundations and it 
is not a pre-requisite to have knowledge of all of them.  To have some familiarity, 
however, allows a broader appreciation of the multitude of topics that flow from them, 
providing a useful foundation when looking to ‘break into new areas’ (in the words of 
the joint announcement by the England and Wales professional bodies) – and 
particularly helps to appreciate as broad a topic as equality law as embodied in the 
Equality Act 2010.  
